The question of who should utilize the war power has been debated from the founding of the republic and the core issues while couched in different terms, and while war has become much more technologically advanced, remain the same. 
Introduction

"We have already given in example one effectual check to the dog of war by transferring the power of letting him loose from the Executive to the Legislative body..."
Thomas Jefferson: (Letter to
1 Presidential War Power has a long history as an implicit power of the executive granted by the U.S. constitution. It has been lauded as a fundamental power, which provides for a vigorous executive who can actively govern, engage in foreign policy, and provide for the common defense of the union. This view while widely held even by members of congress provides an incomplete picture of both of what the war powers of each branch are and how the framers envisioned their use. Like nearly all of the powers granted to individual branches by the constitutional order, war power as originally conceived was designed to provide for significant checks and balances between branches.
The question of who should utilize the war power has been debated from the founding of the republic and the core issues while couched in different terms, and while war has become much more technologically advanced, remain the same.
The fundamental question is one of what the President can do, and what Congress should do. In what follows I attempt primarily to address the question of what Congress should do with regard to the war powers rather than
what the President can do because the scope of presidential war powers has been extensively researched and written about in the scholarly literature. Instead the institutional structure and policy options that Congress ought to use with relation to the war powers and their execution, and impediments to their use. I begin with an examination of what the constitutional underpinnings of the Congressional War power are, how congress has used them, how congress has responded to vigorous presidential war powers, and why congress seems reluctant to utilize those powers granted them.
(U.S. Constitution, 1787)
When considering the war powers of Congress, these are the words of the Constitution that most readily come to mind, and if they were the only powers mentioned and specifically deeded to Congress their power would remain significant. The ability to declare war was given to congress specifically to prevent the executive from unilateral action, which would engage the United States in open hostilities, as had been the prerogative of the British monarch.
The initial draft of the Constitution had included language providing congress the power to "make war" rather than the final language, which appears to cede some power. (Ketchum 1986) This distinction was debated in detail by those at the convention was altered to provide actual power to the President acting as Commander-in-chief of the military in times of war. In Federalist 74, Alexander Hamilton provides an explanation for the necessity of a vigorous commander in chief. "The direction of war implies the direction of the common strength; and the power of directing and employing the common strength forms a usual and essential part in the definition of the executive authority." (Rossiter et al, 1999) The change in verbiage while significant cannot be construed to imbue the executive with the singular prerogative to utilize the war powers.
Instead it represents recognition of the necessity of direction by a single leader after the decision to utilize the war powers has been made by those with the power to declare war, namely the Congress.
However, the powers given to congress with relation to war power are not limited merely to a single phrase. The Constitution continues and lays out specific powers that are the exclusive prerogative of Congress.
" [To] The delegated authority found in the much less referenced part of Article One Section Eight contains significant war powers. These powers of the purse, organization, and the now arcane ability of congress to authorize private groups to enter into armed conflict provide important vehicles for congress to utilize its portion of the war power.
The ability of Congress to create and organize both the Navy, and Militia imply and inherent connection both to the war power and to the armed forces. Rather than armed forces being the exclusive province of the President, Congress is empowered to create, regulate, oversee, and utilize them with the President acting as the Commander-in-Chief. The inherent powers of the executive regarding the military and war are well balanced by the explicit powers granted to congress by Article 1 Section 8. These powers given to Congress by the founders represent important possibly essential duties of the legislative branch.
The war power granted to Congress by the U.S. Constitution solely authorizes it to declare war, to appropriate money for war, to organize armed forces for the nation, to govern and regulate those forces once organized. These powers suggest a vigorous role for legislative branch in determining the state of war and peace, and seem to require that they be actively involved in the decisions, which would lead a nation to war. These powers are held exclusively by Congress, and as such Congress under the Constitutional order must bear the responsibility of their use. The rationale of the founders to provide power in such a way is easy to see, war power had been one of the most misused powers of the Monarch.
The Use of the War Powers
The use of these war powers by Congress has been manifest in two main ways; the traditional declaration of war, and Resolutions authorizing force. The Traditional Declaration of War has been used only infrequently by the Congress in the two hundred odd years since the convention. The six instances of the use of the formal declaration of war are provided below. The Resolution authorizing war against Great Britain is the first actual declaration of war under the constitution of 1787, and set out a pattern for others to follow, authorizing the president to utilize the powers granted congress under Article 1 Section 8. This pattern of delegating specific powers from the congressional cadre forms the basis of each of the future declarations. Congressional delegation of powers has become common place and begs the question, is delegation of power actually using that power? Is merely allowing the executive to utilize the powers granted congress the purpose the founders had in mind when they granted specific powers to congress. A reading of the Notes from the Convention and the Federalist papers reveals no such specific intent, and no prohibition. The pattern, which was laid out by the War of 1812 declaration, held consistent overtime with each of the major declaration first recognizing that a state of war exists, and then delegating to the president all power to prosecute the war, including those powers delegated to congress by the constitution.
Of course the use of force by the United States has not been limited simply to the six wars mentioned here, and indeed many of the major conflicts of the 20th century simply do not appear on this list and it seems unlikely that they simply prosecuted with no congressional discussion or action. Often the use of force is authorized by a resolution authorizing that force rather than a formal declaration of war. Congress has historically provided these authorizations much like they have granted declarations of war; at the behest of the President and after hostilities already exist. It is instructive to observe the list in some detail as it spans from 1798 -2002 with a variety of circumstances and incidents. The authorization of force in this manner merits unique consideration as it is fundamentally different from a declaration of war in that, as it is not a uniquely held congressional power the joint resolution authorizing force is signed by the President under the normal legislative procedures, and therefore is not solely a congressional act. Again in each instance listed congressional action was in response to a request from the President to utilize force. Nearly every use of the congressional war power has been predicated on the desire of the executive to utilize the war powers granted him under the Constitution. Simply answering the desires of the executive is not the established constitutional order. That there are times when it is appropriate for the President to ask congress for the use of war power is not argued here. Rather it is argued that one would expect under the constitutionally mandated system Congress would undertake its war power independently from time to time.
This is not to say that there haven't been attempts by congress from time to time to exercise control of the use of War Power. These attempts have mostly tried to force the President to avoid committing troops to hostile areas without the approval of Congress. Congress has seemed to desire mostly to be consulted and to give approval to actions the executive wants to undertake. The roots of this power are found in the informal oversight authorities provided by the constitution to congress through budgetary, regulatory, and impeachment powers. Frederick Kaiser writes that, "… the necessary and proper clause allows Congress to pass laws that mandate oversight, grant relevant authority to itself and its support agencies, and impose specific obligations on the executive branch, such as reporting or consultation requirements." This conception of congressional oversight has been the chief form by which attempts to curtail executive war power expansion has occurred. Congress has not declared any war, or utilized the other powers listed in Article 1Section 8 outside a request from the President. They have instead attempted to assert power in one primary way through the post Vietnam war, the War Powers Resolution.
The War Powers Resolution
The War Powers Resolution was a direct response to both the Vietnam conflict and ever growing concerns about executive power in the post Watergate era. It attempted to create parameters under which Presidents could use military force and the manner in which congress would authorize it. The act, which has been denounced by many as unconstitutional, has yet to see its day before the Supreme Court and remains law as no President or Congress has chosen to attempt to push a challenge to the act to the Supree Court. Presidents have traditionally refused to recognize the act as binding and Congress's have refused to push the issue to a final resolution. The act has therefore been rendered essentially toothless until some future congress chooses to enforce its provisions.
The purpose of the act as described in the resolution it self is , "It is the purpose of this joint resolution to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States to insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the Introduction of the United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicate by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations." That the ends are noble is certainly not disputable, however the resolution introduced highly controversial requirements that have been much discussed in the years since passage.
The Specific Provisions of the Resolution have been much discussed, and are relatively straight forward, although a plethora of Presidents have managed to either willfully or through ignorance managed to avoid the intent of the act by refusing to utilize the specific provisions. 5.C Despite the provisions of this resolution, the President must remove troops at any time upon receipt of a concurrent resolution directing that action.
In only one case has a report been submitted pursuant to Section 4.A.1, by President Ford in the Mayaguez capture, which had little effect as the report was released only after the operation was completed, and therefore no real congressional oversight was possible. (Fisher and Alder 1998) In his veto message 7 which accompanied the resolution back to Congress, President Nixon denounced the act as unconstitutional, a position which every President since has maintained. However, with the clear responsibility of Congress to Declare war, those who which to declare it unconstitutional must as Stephen Carter states; "be prepared to explain the purpose of Article I, Section 8 Clause 11, of the constitution. That provision expressly grants to the Congress the power 'declare war'. If the President of the United States is free to fight a war whether or not one has been declared, then this apparently unambiguous constitutional provision is devoid of significance."
The questions of constitutionality would be moot if there had not been military actions which would be governed by the act since its inception. The history reveals that there are many. The Table which follows illustrates the times when actions have occurred that would qualify under the War Powers Resolution and Presidential actions with regard to the requirements of the Resolution. The refusal of Presidents to submit reports pursuant to the specific section of the War Powers act has not however prevented them from attempting to placate Congress with reports they describe as being consistent with the War Powers Resolution, without either starting the sixty-day clock or recognizing the constitutionality of the resolution itself. The interesting game of chess that has surrounded the War Powers Resolution has done little to settle the question of how the War Powers reserved to congress should be utilized, and have in fact served to increase Presidential Prerogative to commit US troops by giving care blanche to sixty-day operations without congressional approval.
Reasserting Congressional Power?
As such the history of the War Powers Resolution is suspect as to its ability to reassert Congressional War Powers. One of the core constitutional issues, which have troubled many about the Resolution itself, is that it may contain a congressional veto, which has been banned by the Supreme Court.
Within the War Powers Resolution is a provision under which congress can direct the president by concurrent resolution to remove troops from any theatre of hostility. The order of either a single house of congress or both acting under a concurrent resolution to force executive action was invalidated by INS V. CHADHA. The case stated that the use of a legislative veto was a violation of the presentment clause, which requires that all legislation be presented to the President for his affirmation or veto. The case for the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution's provision which has been called a legislative veto is not invalidated by the above case.
Stephen Carter asserts that, "The War Powers Resolution is constitutional because its terms constitute a congressional definition of the word 'war' as it is used in article I." The distinction essentially is that the unconstitutional legislative veto is creating new law, and the War Powers Resolution is merely defining and asserting a Congressional power that has neither been delegated nor belongs to any other branch. As such Congressional War Powers should be able to direct the President when war is permissible.
A second school asserts that most of the conflicts where war has not been declared have not really been wars, but rather some other type of military conflicts which would exist under the purview of the commander-in-chief to prosecute without congressional authorization. This assertion is based in simple tradition, that this has in fact occurred. The question of these more limited engagements were considered as early as 1800 when in Bas v. Tingey, "The Court held that it is for Congress alone to authorize either an 'imperfect' (limited) war or a 'perfect' (declared) war." Fisher furthers clarifies citing Talbot V. Seeman, "A year later, the Court stated with great clarity: 'The whole powers of war, being by the constitution of the United States, vested in congress, the acts of that body alone can be resorted to as our guides in the enquiry." (Fisher and Alder 1998) Clearly regardless of size military actions involving hostilities require congressional oversight and authorization. As such the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution is affirmed.
The far bigger question is whether it has or could reassert Congressional War Power. As has been described above the reality is that the President may now with full permission of Congress enter into hostilities for 60 days and most likely 90 days with out congressional permission. As such the War Powers Resolution has been a mixed bag. While it forces interaction between the President and Congress on matters of war it has done little to promote the actual use of War Power by Congress, and has instead facilitated the delegation of that power by setting time frames under which permission is not needed. Louis Fisher sums up the Resolution, "In fact, it [The War Powers Resolution] was ill conceived and badly compromised form the start, replete with tortured ambiguity and self-contradiction. The net result was to legalize a scope for independent presidential power that would have astonished the Framers…" (Fisher and Alder 1998) The reality of the failure of Congress to effectively utilize the war powers that the constitution delegates to it is well proved by the litany of examples both cited here and in further reading on the subject. Why then has congress been so reluctant, or perhaps unable to utilize the delegate powers. The failure of Congress in this regard is not an innovation of the 20th century. The roots of the problem are found in the very nature of the legislative body, and the necessity of reelection.
The questions of war and peace are almost always of such a time sensitive nature that the ability of legislative bodies to effectively deal with the intricacies of them is nearly impossible. It is in this deliberative structure that the reason for Presidential requests for Declarations of War, Authorizations of Force, and independent actions are found. The framers considered the tensions between swift action and deliberative consideration as they drafted the constitution. Indeed from this very concern came the Presidential ability to take military actions when the US was attacked or invaded with out congressional declaration of war, and why the first draft of the constitution was altered to give Congress the power to "declare war" rather than the much more expansive "make war" The recent "War on Terror" delivered a near daily discussion of supporting the President from members of congress, and very little discussion of increasing the role Congress should play with relation to the war. In fact, Congress sanctioned the war on terror with all of its ambiguity with no specific enemy, no time line, and no real objectives. There seems to be no potential action that couldn't be construed to fit under this authorization of force.
Even more important to the ebb of congressional war power than the deliberative nature of the institution, is the political realities of reelection, and the potential political liability of utilizing the War Power. These political liabilities come from members being forced to vote for or against potential military actions, and then live with the consequences of those votes. As such many members of Congress are content to allow the "commander-in-chief" to bear full responsibility for the military action, and to make him responsible for the action.
The motivation of members of congress to avoid being seen as questioning the use of the United States military emerges from the "rally around the flag effect" used by Regens to explain why Congress members are so hesitant to vote against war measures. He identifies the effect as, "a president facing a foreign policy crisis is able to invoke national interest in support of his policy during the crisis in the manner Sigelman and Conover described as capitalizing on 'threats from outside a system [that] promote cohesion inside the system." (Regens 1995) In short the good will generated by the necessity of Military Action may serve to undermine those who do not support the action. The flip side of the coin however is the "costs of war hypothesis", which essentially asserts that as armed conflict continues the costs of war will result in growing dissatisfaction with the party in power who instigated the now costly military action. The sum of both these hypotheses drive members of congress to distance themselves as far as possible from the use of the War Powers. They instead wish to be supportive when the national opinion supports war and skeptical when the opinion is one of disaproval. This desire is clearly illustrated by the desire of nearly all members of congress to provide both the power and responsibility for the recent Iraq war to the President. Congress appeared to want to avoid the potential problems that come from the use of the war powers, and yet to still have those powers used when the perception was that they were necessary. As such it has abrogated its power to the executive branch in practice, if not in total. The irony of this perceived reality is that an empirical study by James L. Regens essentially negates the conventional wisdom in modern elections, those who vote against military action are no more likely to be defeated than those who do not. However as always politics is not necessarily a question of reality but is rather one of perception.
It is certainly understandable from the point of view of individual members of Congress that they would be reluctant to utilize War Powers in the form originally intended by the Framers. However, the perceptions, which dictate the concern for reelection, are phantoms of rumor and lack substance when empirically evaluated.
The situation certainly seems dire for the continued existence of Congressional War Power, or at least Congress's willingness to utilize those powers. The prescription to reassert these powers is relatively simple in its requirements and politically and administratively complex in its implementation. In short Congress must demand, and enforce its demands to supervise the War Powers, with both the benefits and costs of doing so, if it is ever to reclaim them from the executive branch.
